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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL J. BIRKELAND, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20090766-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ic-k'k'k'k 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTENDED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant's opposition to 
restitution by finding that under Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) the victim suffered 
"pecuniary harm" because data from his employer's laptop computer was corrupted. (R. 
48-44; 66-69; 81: 23-40). 
Standard of Review: When the issue of whether restitution was proper based on 
statutory interpretation, the trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
law for which the lower court's statutory interpretation is given is given no deference, but 
l 
is assessed for correctness. State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also, 
State v. Gibson, 2006 UT App 490,1j 6, 153 P.3d 771. 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Defendant's no contest 
plea to a misdemeanor qualified as an admission of "criminal activity" under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38-102(2) and thus permitted imposition of restitution of $9,838.00. (R. 48-
44; 66-69; 81: 23-40). 
Standard of Review: When the issue of whether restitution was proper based on 
statutory interpretation, the trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of 
law for which the lower court's statutory interpretation is given is given no deference, but 
is assesses for correctness. State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also, 
State v. Gibson, 2006 UT App 490, If 6, 153 P.3d 771. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutes constitutional piovisions are contained in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Michael Birkeland appeals from the restitution order of $9,838.00 by the 
Honorable Claudia Laycock, Fourth District Court, arising from a no contest plea to an 
amended charge of Theft, a class A misdemeanor, per Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973). 
(R. 27-20; 80: 3, 5). 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Michael Birkeland was charged by criminal information, filed in the Fourth 
District Court on July 18, 2008, of a single count of Theft, a third-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1973) and 76-6-412 (1997). (R. 1). 
Subsequently, on December 22, 2008, Birkeland pled no contest to the amended charge 
of Theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1973) and 
classified as such based on value of $300.00 to $1,000.00. (R. 20-27). 
At Sentencing, on November 19, 2008, a Misdemeanor Sentencing Guideline 
Recommendation was prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. Judge Laycock 
suspended the maximum jail sentence, placed Birkeland on court supervised probation, 
and imposed a fine of $765.00 plus $250.00 attorney recoupment fee. (R. 32-34). At that 
time, a Restitution Hearing was set for January 14, 2009. 
At the Restitution Hearing, Perry Stewart, a professor employed by Utah Valley 
University, testified about the stolen laptop and its contents. (R. 78). Following the 
Hearing, the State filed its Motion and Proposed Order for Restitution. (R. 42-39). 
Birkeland then filed his Objection to the Proposed Order with the State's Reply following. 
(R. 48-43; 52-49). After Oral Argument regarding imposition of restitution, the trial 
court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 81; 69-65). The 
trial court concluded that Stewart suffered "pecuniary damage" which could be recovered 
in a civil action and thus qualifies as proper restitution under Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
102(6) (2005). (R.67). 
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Furthermore, the trial court denied Birkeland's argument that his no contest plea to 
a class A misdemeanor did not qualify as "criminal activity" as defined by Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-102(2) (2005). (R. 67). 
After a restitution hearing and briefing on the restitution issue, the trial court 
ordered Birkeland to pay a modified restitution amount. (R. 68; 66). Although Stewart 
estimated his hourly wage at $50.00 with approximately 950 hours of work in preparing 
the documents on the laptop (totaling $47,500), the trial court determined that Stewart's 
hourly wage was $41.00 and permitted him to collect on 25% of the hours reported (238 
hours) for a total of $9,758.00 in restitution to Stewart, plus and additional $80.00 to 
Utah Valley University for payment to MacDocs in attempting to recover the files, 
totaling $9838.00 in restitution. (R. 68; 66). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Perry Stewart 
At the time of the theft, Stewart was employed by Utah Valley University as an art 
professor, teaching art design, illustration, drawing, and painting. (R. 78: 4). The year of 
the theft, 2008, the University paid Stewart $64,000 in salary. (R. 78: 20). Stewart 
estimated that in his full-time teaching capacity, he will spend between somewhere 
around 30 hours per week preparing for classes and anywhere between 5 and 25 hours 
per week fulfilling other scholarly or academic requirements. (R. 78: 20). 
Stewart testified that since the theft he has had to put in more time at work to fix 
the problems related to the theft. (R. 78: 20). However, he also testified that his income 
was unaffected. (R. 78: 20-21). 
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Stewart was requesting $47,500 in restitution to recreate documents either deleted 
or inoperable due to the theft of the University's laptop. (R. 78: 12) (Exhibit 1). Stewart 
described the laptop that was taken as a silver, Mac Book Pro, which was purchased by 
the University for his use in the classroom. (R. 78: 4). 
Stewart possessed the laptop for approximately two years before it was stolen. (R. 
78: 5). On a day-to-day basis Stewart would use images and presentations and project 
them in class using a LCD projector, take attendance, and do grading all on the laptop. 
(R. 78: 5). These presentations generally were configured through Power Point and 
contained pictures/images. (R. 78: 5). Although Stewart did not email or print these 
presentations, he would allow students to copy the Power Point presentation. (R. 78: 6). 
These presentations were created by Stewart and not provided to him by the University. 
(R. 78: 6). 
Stewart's schedule and use of the laptop presentations varied. (R. 78: 6-7). The 
time that he spent on the presentations depended on whether he had new material or not; 
although a lot of the presentations he had created in the past. (R. 78: 7). Stewart 
estimated that each presentation would take him about six (6) to eight (8) hours to create. 
(R. 78: 7). 
Stewart testified that from the day the laptop was taken to the day it was returned 
to him, most of the information on the computer was deleted, leaving some recovered 
files. (R 78: 8). Stewart took the laptop to Mac Docs in Orem, Utah to attempt to 
recover the lost files. (R. 78: 8). Mac Docs were able to recover nearly 27,000 
documents, which appeared unidentifiable by file name, unless Stewart was to open the 
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files, identify them, and rename and save them. (R. 78: 9). Many of the Power Point 
presentations, however, would not open after they were recovered. (R. 78: 9). Stewart 
testified that he was in the process of recreating these files. (R. 78: 9). 
Stewart also testified about the process he has gone through to calculate and value 
the time spent on recreating these presentations. (R. 78: 11). Stewart testified that he 
went through the documents recovered to determine how many were still intact, which 
took "hundreds of hours." (R. 78: 11). Then, Stewart counted all the files that would not 
open, but focused on the Power Point presentations because of the time required in 
creating them, which was between 3-10 hours each. (R. 78: 11-12). 
Based on his calculations, Stewart estimated that he would have to recreate at least 
one hundred (100) of the presentations because they were either deleted or inoperable. 
(R. 78: 12). Stewart provided his estimations in recreating the work lost and the value of 
that work in a document presented at the restitution hearing. (Exhibit 1). In that 
document, Stewart estimated that in recreating only the Power Point presentations, he 
would spend about 600 hours recreating 100 presentations - approximately 6 hours per 
presentation. (Exhibit 1) (R. 78: 15). Then, estimating the value at $50 per hour and 
multiplying that by the 600 hours, Stewart calculated that it would cost $30,000 to 
recreate the Power Point presentations. (Exhibit 1) (R. 78: 15-16). Furthermore, Stewart 
determined that in the past few months he had spent about 350 hours recreating syllabi, 
course content and lectures. Using similar calculations ($50 per hour multiplied by 350 
hours of work), Stewart concluded and additional $17,500 value in work to recreate 
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documents. (Exhibit 1). This totaled $47,500, plus an additional $78 for the University 
for costs to Mac Docs to retrieve files from the computer. (Exhibit 1) (R. 78: 13-14, 17). 
B. Testimony of Michael Birkeland 
Birkeland testified with regards to his ability to pay restitution. (R. 81: 4). 
Birkeland testified that he was a self-employed salesman through is company Killer B, 
but contracted with another company, Full Nelson Creative, to sell radio and television 
advertising. (R. 81: 6-8). With regards to his employment, Birkeland testified that the 
advertisement business has suffered due to the economy. (R. 81: 14). And that while a 
few years ago he was earning $3,000 to $4,000 per month; his current income was 
usually about $1,500 per month. (R. 81: 5-6, 14). Of that $1,500, about $1,200 was 
attributed to residual sales from the previous year. (R. 81: 5-6, 13-14). 
Of that income, Birkeland paid $1,200 per moth in child support to his ex-wife, 
leaving him with approximately $300 to $800 per month. (R. 81: 6). Birkeland owned 
no assets and was living rent and utility free in a friend's apartment in Salt Lake City. (R. 
81:6, 21-22). Birkeland testified that while he did have three years of college education, 
but was hesitant to return to school because of the financial stresses with having 
approximately $24,000 in student-loan debt, which was to be paid at about $320 per 
month. (R. 81:7-8, 16). 
Birkeland also testified about another possible source of income. Birkeland 
testified that he was employed as an actor in several "lower than normal Hollywood 
scale," non-union films. (R. 81: 10). Between 2001 and 2006, Birkeland was employed 
as an actor in several films: Single's Ward, The R.M., Home Teachers, Church Ball, 
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Single Second Ward, Latter-Day Night Live, and Shooting Star. (R 81: 10-11). 
Birkeland testified that work on these projects would typically last a few weeks and he 
would be paid about $ 150 per day for his services. (R. 81: 11). 
Additionally, Birkeland testified about what his "thoughts" were regarding the 
State's request for restitution in the amount of $47,000. (R 81: 19). 
STATE: Okay. Mr. Beirkeland (sic), what are your thoughts about what you 
heard Mr. Stewart say about the economic injury that he alleges to have incurred? 
BIRKELAND: Well, depends. I don't know how far I can speak into that. 
STATE: Okay. 
BIRKELAND: To what level. I didn't plead guilty. I pled no contest. I'm the 
one that reported the computer. He didn't report the computer stolen at all. Ever. 
STATE: Okay. 
BIRKELAND: So I have a lot of objections, but I don't know how far I can go 
into that. 
STATE: No, that's actually the answer I was looking for. 
(R. 81:21). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial courts are bound by the parameters of Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-3 8a-102 
and 302 in assessing restitution. Furthermore, a trial court cannot grant restitution for 
anything other than pecuniary harm, which is defined as economic injury. Here, 
Birkeland had pled no contest to theft, a class A misdemeanor, for having deprived 
Stewart of the laptop provided to Stewart by his employer, Utah Valley University. 
8 
While the laptop was recovered some documents/files were either deleted or corrupted 
and could not be accessed and Stewart began to recreate these documents/files. 
Birkeland asserts that the harm incurred by Stewart, while inconvenient, was a temporal 
harm, not a pecuniary, or economic, harm. Therefore, the trial court erred by interpreting 
the restitution statute to cover such harm and the order should be rescinded. 
Second, the trial court further erred by ordering restitution in light of the fact that 
Birkeland did not agree to pay such restitution, never admitted to deleting or corrupting 
the data on the computer, nor was restitution appropriate because the "criminal activity" 
for which Birkeland pled no contest to was theft of the laptop computer, not criminal 
mischief and destruction of those items. Therefore, the restitution order was unlawful 
and should be rescinded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred by Ordering Restitution Because Stewart was a 
Salaried Employee Of the University and Suffered No Pecuniary (Economic) 
Harm as Required Per Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 
In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court erred in rejecting Birkeland's objection to 
the restitution request on the basis that Stewart "did not suffer pecuniary damage as 
denied in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6)." (R. 67). The trial court's basis for rejecting 
Birkeland's objection to restitution was that that in his objection "the defendant focused 
only on the language addressing fair market value, lost earnings and medical expenses. 
The defendant's argument is invalid because it ignores the language in the statute which 
defines pecuniary damage as economic injury which could be recovered in civil action." 
(R. 67). The trial court further concluded that Stewart could have recovered in a civil 
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action and that Birkeland "incorrectly treats the statute's language as exclusionary, not 
inclusive[;]" such as punitive or exemplary damages, which are excluded. (R. 67). The 
trial court, however, incorrectly interpreted the language and scope of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-38a-302 (2005) in ordering $9,758.00 in restitution to Stewart. 
Utah Code Annotated. § 77-38a-302 (2005) clearly lays out the criterion for 
assessing restitution following a criminal conviction. The code states that "[w]hen a 
defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages ...the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this chapter...." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, any 
restitution ordered is predicated on demonstrable pecuniary damages. 
Per section 77-38a-102(6) (2005), "pecuniary damage" is defined as "all 
demonstrable economic injury ...which a person could recover in a civil action arising out 
of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair 
market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including lost earnings...." (emphasis added). While the phrase "economic injury" is not 
defined by statute, its common meaning would be damages to resources that would in 
turn adversely affect, through impaired production, use or distribution of those resources, 
income streaming from those resources. Cf, economic. Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com 
Unabridged. Random House, Inc. http://dictionary.reference.com^browse/economic 
(accessed: April 12, 2010). This meaning of economic injury, within the meaning of 
pecuniary damages, is consistent with decisions from the Utah appellate courts. 
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For example, in State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, 221 P.3d 273, this Court found 
that the victim was not entitled to restitution for her relocation expenses. Although this 
Court did not reach the issue of whether such restitution was appropriate by statute, it did 
address the principle of whether "[restitution may be ordered for pecuniary damages 
arising out of the defendant's criminal activity." Brown, 2009 UT App 285, f^ 10. In 
Brown, the State sought restitution against Brown for relocation expenses of $2,789.74 
his girlfriend incurred due to Brown's criminal activity. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, | 4. 
Obviously, Brown's girlfriend paid out-of-pocket to relocate, due to Brown's actions, and 
was seeking reimbursement. While this Court ultimately concluded that the record was 
insufficient to support restitution for relocation expenses, Brown provides a clear 
example of what pecuniary damage is and distinguishes the present facts. 
Another clear example of pecuniary damage appears in State v. Harvell, 2009 UT 
App 271, 220 P.3d 174. Implicitly, this Court addressed the restitution matter because it 
believed that the harm caused qualified as "pecuniary damage" under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-38a-302. Harvell 2009 UT App 271, f^ 8. In Harvell the defendant appealed a 
restitution order requiring him to pay for brake repairs and to replace an iPod. Harvell 
2009 UT App 271, f 7. The restitution ordered in Harvell arose from his criminal 
activity - being charged with burglary, theft by receiving, and theft. Harvell, 2009 UT 
App 271, If 6. Again, this Court addressed other more central issues, but implicitly must 
have concluded that replacing the brakes and the iPod qualified as pecuniary damage, 
distinguishable from the present facts. See also, State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, 40 
P.3d 1143 (restitution for stolen property was appropriate); State v. Larsen, 2009 UT App 
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293, 221 P.3d 277 (restitution to reimburse victim for costs associated with impound of 
vehicle was appropriate); and State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, 82 P.3d 211 (restitution 
arising from defendant having stolen a vehicle was appropriate). 
Here, Stewart did not incur "pecuniary damage" because no "economic injury" 
occurred. Stewart testified that he was a salaried professor for Utah Valley University, 
earning approximately $64,000 per year at that time. (R. 78: 20). Although the 
University's laptop was taken for a brief time, and Stewart was able to continue teaching. 
In fact, Stewart testified that even if the computer had not been taken he would have 
earned the same salary. (R. 78: 20). Thus, regardless of whether the laptop was 
recovered or not, Stewart would have had suffered no adverse financial impact. Any loss 
incurred by Stewart was not a qualified pecuniary damage for purposes of restitution 
because no economic injury occurred. 
Under different circumstances pecuniary damages would be more evident. For 
example, had the University employed Stewart as an independent contractor, rather than a 
salaried employee, and the theft impaired or prevented Stewart from fulfilling his 
contractual obligation to the University, then pecuniary, or economic, injury could be 
established. However, Stewart clearly received his salary. And furthermore, the State 
failed to show any demonstrable pecuniary damages, just an inconvenience. 
While Stewart has certainly been inconvenienced, section § 77-38a-302 of the 
Utah Code does not provide restitution for inconveniences, but rather pecuniary damage 
only. (R. 81: 23-27). Section § 77-38a-102(6) specifically addresses possible economic 
injury and specifically excludes "punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering." 
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Stewart has suffered no economic harm, but merely an inconvenience of time. Thus, 
restitution for that inconvenience falls under the category of punitive, exemplary damages 
and/or pain and suffering. 
Here, however, Stewart suffered no harm other than an inconvenience to renew his 
teaching materials. Unlike Brown, Harvell, Mast and the other cases, Stewart did not 
suffer damages that are economically calculable. In those cases, the victims alleged out-
of-pocket expenses/costs due to the defendant's criminal activity. Here, Stewart suffered 
no out-of-pocket expenses, nor did he suffer any other economic injury, as he was paid 
his same salary. As such, the trial court erred in concluding that Stewart suffered 
pecuniary damages and ordering restitution in the amount of $9,758.00. 
II. The Trial Court Erred by Ordering Restitution for Criminal Activity that 
Birkeland Neither Admitted To, Pled Guilty To or Agreed To Pay 
"A court may order restitution only if the defendant has been convicted of a crime 
that resulted in pecuniary damages and agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal 
conduct." State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273,13, 987 P.2d 1289 (emphasis in original). 
This rule is also clearly set forth by statute: "When a defendant is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages..., the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime... or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea disposition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l). Thus, 
Birkeland must have either agreed to the restitution or admitted to the harm alleged. 
Birkeland did neither. 
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Here, Birkeland entered a plea of no contest to theft, a class A misdemeanor 
according to the value of the item taken (valued at least $300 but less than $1,000). (R. 
27-20); see, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(c). Also, the record is clear that Birkeland 
did not agree to pay restitution in this matter. (R. 27-20; 81: 20-21). Thus, restitution 
could only be possible based on the first clause of Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-302(l) 
- Birkeland's "criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages...." 
"'Criminal activities' means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2). First, to the latter part of the definition, at no point did 
Birkeland admit responsibility to the trial court, even with or without admitting 
commission of the conduct. In fact, Birkeland's exchange with the prosecutor 
emphasizes that point: 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Mr. Beirkeland (sic), what are your thoughts about what 
you heard Mr. Stewart say about the economic injury that he alleges to have 
incurred? 
BIRKELAND: Well, depends. I don't know how far I can speak into that. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. 
BIRKELAND: To what level. I didn't plead guilty. I pled no contest. I'm the 
one that reported the computer. He didn't report the computer stolen at all. Ever. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. 
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BIRKELAND: So I have a lot of objections, but I don't know how far I can go 
into that. 
(R. 81:21). 
Second, Birkeland plead no contest to theft of the computer, a class A 
misdemeanor, never having admitted to tampering or damaging files stored on that 
computer. (R. 27-20). The trial court is limited in its power to impose restitution, in that 
it may only order restitution for the criminal activity a defendant is convicted of. See, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-302(l) and 77-38a-102(2) (emphasis added). Birkeland's no 
contest plea to theft, a class A misdemeanor, admits to only having deprived Stewart of 
the computer, not damaging it. See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. This Court addressed 
this very issue in State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curium). 
In Watson, the defendant was charged with criminal homicide, attempted criminal 
homicide and obstruction of justice for having driven her co-defendant from the crime 
scene. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, \ 2. Through plea bargaining, Watson pled guilty to 
attempted obstruction of justice and was ordered, over her objection, to pay restitution 
relating to the death of one of the victims. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ]f 2. This Court's 
analysis rested on the fact that a trial court must "focus on admissions made to the 
sentencing court[;] [i]n other words, the statute requires that responsibility for the 
criminal conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order 
restitution. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ^ 5. In conclusion, this Court held that a trial 
court cannot make inferences about admissions, but must strictly rely on either the 
defendant's admissions or plea. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, f 5. 
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Similarly, this Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 
402, 40 P.3d 1143. In Mast, the defendant was charged with forgery and theft by 
receiving stolen property. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, f^ 5. Defendant eventually pled 
guilty to theft by receiving and admitted having taken only certain property items, which 
were returned, valued at $1020.00. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, ^ 5. As part of her sentence, 
the trial court ordered that she pay restitution in the amount of $5090, which was the total 
value of property, along with other costs incurred, alleged to have been taken from the 
victim. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, ^ 5. Defendant objected to this restitution amount 
because she was only claiming responsibility for particular items, not the entire amount 
of harm alleged to have been incurred by the victim. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, f^ 6. 
Ultimately, this Court, like in Watson, held that the restitution order was erroneous. 
Mast, 2001 UT App 402, ^ 16. This Court found that although a burglary had occurred 
and impacted the victim, it was a "crime for which defendant was not convicted and for 
which she admitted no responsibility." Thus, this Court held that the defendant could not 
"be held responsible for the other stolen items that remained missing[]" and vacated the 
restitution order. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, ffij 16, 19; see also. State v. Brickley, 2002 
UT App 342, % 12, 60 P.3d 582 (holding that restitution was improper because the 
defendant did not admit responsibility for all of the harm to the victim alleged to have 
occurred). 
Presently, the restitution order against Birkeland is based on nearly identical facts 
as those in Mast and Watson. Here, Birkeland plead no contest to the theft of a laptop 
computer, only. Birkeland never admitted to damaging any programs or files stored on 
16 
that computer, nor was such restitution part of his plea agreement. (R. 27-20). As such, 
the trial court, mush like in Watson, was left to make inferences about whether Birkeland 
was the one responsible for damaging files stored on that laptop.1 Without statements 
from Birkeland clearly admitting to the destruction or damage of the files stored on the 
laptop computer, the trial court had no authority to order restitution in the amount of 
$9838.00. (R. 68; 66). 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the trial court committed error in its interpretation and ultimate 
application of the law, in that no pecuniary damage occurred and Birkeland did not agree 
to pay or admit to damaging the files/documents on the laptop computer, Birkeland 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's restitution order of $9,838.00. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of April, 2010. 
Michael Brown 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
1
 The theft of the laptop computer, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402, is a completely 
separate and distinct criminal act from damaging the electronic contents of that computer, 
much like the criminal offenses the defendants were charged with in State v. Mast, 2001 
UT App 402, and State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273. Thus, the State's failure to prove 
Birkeland committed the damage, which could have appropriately been charged under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102 as Criminal Mischief, cannot be overlooked in ordering 
restitution for criminal activity not admitted to or convicted of. 
17 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant to Utah Attorney General, Appeals Division, 160 East 300 South, Sixth 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 14th day^f April, 2010. 
18 
ADDENDA 
19 
Westlaw, 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-102 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
^1 Chapter 3 8A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
KM Part 1. General Provisions 
-• § 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for 
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition that a defendant agree 
to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, which a person 
could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and 
includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost 
earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant setting forth the special 
terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the defendant, accepting a 
plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him 
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abey-
ance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and the defendant set-
ting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea 
may be held in abeyance. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and defendant including diversion, 
plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other 
jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including prejudgment 
interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a re-
ward, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further de-
fined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that the person receiving the 
payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative action, proceed with 
prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the 
defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2001, c. 137. S 3. eff. April 30,2001: Laws 2003, c. 278, g 2, eff. May 5.2003: Laws 2005. c. 96, § 3, eff. 
May 2,2005. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Westlaw, 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
* i Chapter 3 8 A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
*1 Part 3. Restitution Requirements 
-• § 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any 
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as pro-
vided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposi-
tion. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determin-
ing whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defen-
dant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to 
pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the court shall make the 
reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the de-
fendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any crirninal conduct ad-
mitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an 
offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person 
directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all 
relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a vic-
tim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical or mental 
health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recog-
nized by the law of the place of treatment; 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of or damage to tools 
or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employ-
ment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the 
factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and' 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard 
to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the 
court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. 
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year af-
ter sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year after sentencing may be 
determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an order of judgment and com-
mitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30. 2001: Laws 2002, c. 35, g 13, eff. May 6, 2002: Laws 2002, c. 185, S 51, eff. 
May 6,2002: Laws 2003, c. 285, 8 1, eff. May 5,2003: Laws 2005, c. 96. g 5, eff. May 2, 2005. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2010 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Debbie Hill (8201) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
51 S. University Avenue, Ste. 206 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 801-852-1070 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
: LAW AND ORDER 
vs. 
: Case No. 081402001 
MICHAEL BIRKELAND : 
: Judge Claudia Laycock 
Defendant. : 
On July 1, 2009, this matter came before the Court for the purpose of restitution. The 
Plaintiff was represented by Assistant Utah County Attorney Craig Johnson. Defendant was 
present and represented by counsel, Debbie Hill. The Court, having received memoranda from 
both parties, and having received testimony at both the January 14, 2009 and July 1, 2009 
evidentiary hearings, does hereby make and enter the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 22, 2008, the Defendant entered a no contest plea to theft, a class A 
misdemeanor. This plea was based on the theft of a laptop computer supplied by Utah Valley 
University to Professor Perry Stewart as part of his employment. Defendant was sentenced on 
November 19, 2008, at which time a restitution hearing was scheduled for January 14, 2009. 
2. At the January 14, 2009 evidentiary hearing, Mr. Stewart testified that although the laptop 
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computer was returned, several programs and documents, representing his work product, had 
been deleted and otherwise corrupted He testified that Utah Valley University paid MacDocs 
$80.00 to try to restore the documents, but that he had to put in several hours, approximately 950 
hours, to restore his documents, power-point presentations, syllabi and lesson plans. Mr. Perry 
testified that he is salaried, earning $64,000 a year. The State requested $47,580 00 in restitution, 
arguing that Mr. Perry was entitled to this sum as it represented the approximate 950 hours he 
spent, both at work and at home, restoring and recreating his lost work. 
3. The Court finds that because Mr. Perry's request for restitution includes hours spent at 
home and at work, where he was being paid by Utah Valley University, he is entitled to a 
percentage of the 950 hours. Therefore, the Court allows 25% of the hours requested, a total of 
238 hours. Furthermore, the Court finds that Mr. Perry's hourly wage, based on a salary of 
$64,000.00, for a nine month contract, is $41.00 per hour. Multiplying the 238 hours by $41.00 
results in a complete restitution amount of $9758.00 to Mr. Perry, with an additional $80.00 to 
Utah Valley University for its payment to MacDocs. 
4. On July 1, 2009, Defendant testified as to his ability to pay the proposed restitution 
amount. Defendant testified that he was self employed, business was slow, and that he earned 
approximately $1500.00 a month. Defendant testified that he does not have an advanced degree. 
He testified that he pays child support of $1200.00 a month and has a student loan balance of 
$24,000.00, which he pays at $320.00 month. The Court finds that although Defendant's 
business is currently slow, he has the ability to work, and, therefore, the ability to pay the 
complete restitution amount. The Court ordered restitution is $9758.00 to Mr. Perry and $80.00 
to Utah Valley University. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order for Restitution, the defendant argued that 
Mr. Perry did not suffer pecuniary damage as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6). 
However, the defendant focused only on the language addressing fair market value, lost earmngs 
and medical expenses. The defendant's argument is invalid because it ignores the language in 
the statute which defines pecuniary damage as economic injury which could be recovered in a 
civil action. The Court finds that the amount requested by Mr. Perry could be recovered in a civil 
action. Furthermore, the defendant incorrectly treats the statute's language as exclusionary, not 
inclusive. The Court finds that the only items excluded by the statute are punitive or exemplary 
damages and pain and suffering, not the request made by Mr. Perry. 
The defendant also argued that the conduct to which he entered a no contest plea does not 
meet the definition of "criminal activity," as defined in U.C.A. § 77-38-102(2), sufficient to order 
the degree of restitution requested by the state. The defendant argued that U.C.A. § 77-38-102(2) 
defines criminal activity as "any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." The defendant argued that he plead 
no contest to a class A misdemeanor, and, therefore, was not convicted of a crime exceeding a 
value amount of $1000.00. The Court denies the defendant's argument. 
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ORDER 
Based on foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Court orders restitution 
in the amount of $9838 00, with $9758 00 to be paid to Mr Perry Stewart and $80 00 to be paid 
to Utah Valley University 
Signed this ^ Q ^ a y of \fjM\ , 2 0 0 ^ 
L4AAJ^9\J 
Approved as to form 
< 
Craig Johnson 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Claudia Laycock 
District Court Judged 
% 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed postage prepaid a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to the Utah County .Attorney, 100 East Center, 
Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606 this i5_ day of Tlik, , 20<->o 
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To Whom it may concern: 
RE: Restitution request in case State of Utah vs. Michael Birkeland 
CA#:F08-1607 
The defendant- Michael Birkeland, upon stealing the computer proceeded to delete 
information from it, replacing files and software as if it were going to be his own 
personal computer. Which I'm sim- MI< h\< m^n* 
An attempt was made to recover missing files, documents, spreadsheets and presentations 
from the hard drive. The computer was taken to Macdocs in Orem, the information they 
could recover was saved to a file on the desktop. Between 300 and 400 hours have hem 
spent opening and reviewing data from the hard drive. There are still a little over 1 ?» 
be opened and reviewed. Many of the files could not be opened, they had become 
corrupted. I teach art at UVU, since art is visual I had in most cases 10-30 power point 
lecture/presentations per class Over <hr ^ ^ fw *-<w **.*] : x / J T J Mve taught the 
following courses: 
. i i l W J 
" -ddt- . 
A Ac 
* irawing II 
:olortheory 
1 rawing ior illustration 
lustrative media and techniques I 
$. illustrative media and techniques II 
9. figure drawing 
10. figure structure 
11. drawing for animation 
12. illustration I 
13. illustration II 
14. interpretive drawing 
:
 5, rendering the human head 
6.. advanced illustration 
The power point presentations which wer\ cr--- ,PL iaiL m number 38.1 recovered 2 7 
files and saved them. There are several othci& ami weren't recoverable, It is possibly due 
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to the length of time it had been since they were opened or I had last taught the class, I 
think a very reasonable estimate would be 80 presentations, though I am. sure it is 
probably more in the range of 100. Estimating a modest guess of 10 presentations per 
class, which would be 160 total, those recovered (27), those corrupted (38) and those lost 
(80). I have or will have ncHv 1 n0 presentations to redo. On average one presentation 
takes easily 6 hours to create and organize many of them are more time involved than 
that. Making calculations easy, lets say I have 100 presentations either recreated or have 
still yet to recreate. I will need to invest or have invested 600 hours for only the 
powerpoint presentations. I make over $50/hour and think it fair that I calculate my time 
and worth accordingly. The calculations, come to 600 (hours) x $50/hour = $30,000. 
Also missing were Syllabi for each of the classes, assignments (weekly or bi-weekly), 
lecture notes and thousands of images collected for lectures. The past summer was spent, 
searching through files, trying to remember key words and remaking files that were 
missing and corrupted. There were multiple thousands of files that were opened renamed 
and saved or deleted. The majority of which were junk files that needed to be deleted. 
But, I had to open every file check it, review it and do something with it. I have lost 
nearly 18 years of material in many cases. Should it have been backed up? Yes without 
question, on the other hand it shouldn't have been stolen, information deleted, my entire 
life as a professor was wiped from the computer. The task of going through thousands of 
files, recreating syllabi and assignments, recollecting research, data and examples should 
be considered as well. I estimate that in the past months since losing my files I have spent 
inimum of 350 hours recreating syllabi, course content and lectures in addition to the 
er point presentations. There are still probably another couple hundred to go. I am 
•ilatmg 350 hours x $50/hour = $17,500. 
I he combination of the two $30,000 + $17,500 = $47,500. These are the damages I am 
seeking, again this is a moderate estimate of the time I have already spent and will 
continue to spend over the next few years, recreating my fifes, documents and 
presentations. 
As another item for considerai .i\ c a daughter 15 years old and one 19 years old 
who both live at home. Without m* i involvement, I would yet be missing a computer 
and Mr. Birkeland would probably not have been arrested. When he was arrested they 
were quite proud of themselves for helping put a thief in jail When he posted bail and 
was out pending his court appearance, one daughter would not sleep with her window 
ajar at night, nor would she sleep with her bedroom door closed. Even now she refuses to 
close her bedroom door for fear that Michael Birkeland will somehow get through her 
bedroom window and kill her or rape her for helping in his arrest. He has caused 
0 R E M , U T A H 8 4 0 5 8 - 5 9 9 9 - M S 1 6 8 phn 8 0 1 B B 3 B " * " 
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incredible anxiety and fear in the lives of my daughters. Thank you for the consideration 
of my request to have a. bit restored for all that is tumultuous and lost in this series of 
events. 
Sincerely, 
Perry Stewart 
4491 Oxford Street 
Cedar Hills, Utah 84062 
801-492-9544 home 
801-863-7132 office 
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNT!', STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. 
PJaintiff, 
vs. 
^ V Ijjw-jui.. \L 
STATEMENT OF JDEFENDAKT 
IN SUPPORT OF'^SSTY PLEA V 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
>seNo. Q'MOICOI 
' UV\^(^ft-A^ ^ hereby acknowledge and certify thai 1 have been 
advisee of ana thai i unaersianc ine luliowing facts and nghis: 
Notification of Charges 
I air- pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
A. 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
v^&-
Degree 
\WY 
Punishment 
Mm/Max arid/or 
Mi n im u m M a n d a 1 o n ; 
] have received c cop}- of the (Amended j information against me. J have read if or 
had \\ read Lo mt. and J understand the nature and the elements ofcrmt^) to which 1 am 
pleading guilty (or no coniestj. 
Tht elements of die crime(s) to which ] am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
4^MA- V t 
12 S^—A $p^^A-^x^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ D LOOQ 
f understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that 1 committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or. if I am pleading no contest J am not contestmg that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or. if I am pleading no contest I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduci and the conduct of other persons for 
which 1 am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accepi my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty 
for no cont 
Wjp^v t^a^UjA^^ 
J5v^^_^s>\rv-5>c £^ 
h
 ' A _ *^ rf£* 3 o ) ^ ) o x ) 
_ ^ - ^ i p ^ 
Waiver of Constitutional flights 
] am entering these pjeas volunianiy. ] understand thai J have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United Slates. ] also understand that if] plead 
guilty for no contest) J will give up all the foljov/iru: rights: 
Counsel: j know thai 1 have the righi 10 be represented by an attorney and thai if] 
cannot afford one. an attorney v/ili be appointed by the court a< no cost to me. ] understand 
0021 
J 
that J nngb; Jalei, if the judge deiennined thai .) was able be required 10 j >ay ior the 
appointed lawyers service to me. 
yaived my rigbi to counsel. If] have waived my right to counsel, 
loTenow-'irjely, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If J have waived m}; nghi to counsel. J cerufy tliat I have read this statement and that 
I unaersiand the nature arid elements of the charges and crimes LO which J. am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights m tins case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) p)ea(s). 
If J have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is V )cVp>W^—e_ Vj\vV/ ^ 
My attorney and I have fuihy discussed this statemeni, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that J have a right to a speed}-" and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury-' and that I will be giving up thai right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if J were to have 
a jury' trial a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who Testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine ah of "the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if J were to have a jury trial. I could call 
witnesses if I chose to. and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requinng the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If 1 could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against selj-incrimiiiation. 1 imow that if] were to 
have a jury trial J would have the nghi lo testify on my own behalf ! also know that if! 
chose no! 10 testify, no one- could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself 
] also know thai if] chose noi to testify, the jury would be told thai they could DOI bold my 
refusal io testify againsi me. 
'Presumption oi'innocence and burden of proof J know thai if 1 do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), 1 am presumed mnocem until the State proves thai ] am guilty of the 
charged crime(.s). If J choose to fight the charge: againsi me. J need only plead "nol gui)ry/: 
and mv case will be sei for a trial At s trial, the State would have the burden of proving 
each eJemen of the cbsrge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. lithe trial is before a juryy the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
1 understand thai if] plead guilty (or no contest). I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that J committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. J know thai under the Utah Constitution, if J were convicted by a jury or 
judge. J would have the right io appeal nyy conviction and sentence. If] could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the Slate would pa}' those costs forme. I understand thai J am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilt)' (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty. ] am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (01 No Contest) Tie2 
Potential penalties, 1 know the maximum sentence that ma)" be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know thai by pleadmg guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandator)" penalty. I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandator/penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that m addition to a jme; an eighty-five percent (£5%) surcharge will be 
imposed. J also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
cnmes: inciudmg any restitution thai may be owed or charges thai are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one aner another (consecutively), or they may run 
a1 the same time (concurrently). J know thai 1 may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that J plead to. J also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which J have been convicted or which J have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
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imprisoned or on parole. 1 know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and stales on the record that consecutive seniences would be 
inappropriate. 
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Plea bargain. My guilty for no contest) pleat sj (is/are) (is/are noi) hie result of a plea 
"bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties., arid 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any. a?"e full)' contained in this statement, including those 
explained belovs': 
Trial judge not bound. 1 know that an)' charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the changes 
for sentencing, made or sought b}; either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney axe not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they zyLprzss 10 me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification oi Voluntariness 
J am entering thispkz of my own freewill and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any land have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no coniest),,, K'o promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or 1 have had it read to me- by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as- my.7 own. 1 know that 1 am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct 
1 am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney / 
J am ^ ^fears of age. ] have attended school through the y^ grade. J can read 
and understand the English language. If] do no! understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. 1 was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgrnen! when 1 decided to plead guilty. 1 tun not presently under 
the influence of any drag, medication, ot inioxicant: which impair my judgment. 
] believe myself to be of sound and discerning nunc and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my pica. 1 am free of anv mental 
disease, defect or impairment thai would prevem me from understanding v/hai ] am doing 
or from knowingiy: intelligently: and voluntarily entering my plea. 
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J understand that if 1 want to withdraw my guilty for no contest) plea(s)? I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before] have been sentenced and final 
judgment has been entered, ] will on'Jy be allowed (.0 withdraw • my plea if] show good 
CAmt. ] will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after sentence has been announced. 
Dated this J" J-^&'dy of 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
] certify thai I am the attorney for -rthe defendant 
above, and thai I know he/she has read the statement or thai J have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correct])7 stated: and these, along with the other 
representations and deciaraiions made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
U 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. C?JX>\ 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
J certify thai ] am the attorney for the Slate of Utah m the case against 
. , defendant. J have reviewed tins Statement of Defendant 
and fmd thai the lactuai basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, Uireats. or coercion to encourage 
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
Statement and m the attached PJea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the. acceptance 
of the pJea(s) would ^rvc the public interest. // 
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Orel en-
Eased on the facts set fortlj in the foregoing Stateiiienl and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel and based on anv ora] representations in court the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds thai defendant's guilty (or no contest) pjeafs) is/are freely. 
Imowing])7. and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thai the defendant :r; guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
cnme(s) set forth m the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this 3£*Jhy of ficA . . 2_Od§ 
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